market failure and public goods

In contemporary economic theory, intervention in the market is justified when a market has failed, or to provide a public good (really a subset of the first) that private firms would under-supply. I think that both rationales apply to the trading of keeper slots. As comrade Martin indicated, the incentive structure for certain teams is such that a keeper slot has no value. This is not a problem, in itself - but if the "market" at issue is a fairly competitive fantasy league, this incentive structure will fail to provide it. Indeed, "league competitiveness" is a public good in some sense - no one has an incentive to make the league competitive (re: parity) and so we have to intervene to make it happen (assuming that we want to do so; I do).

However, this does not seem to require an outright prohibition on trading keeper slots. As Andy pointed out, we can get around such a prohibition through trades - MLB teams do this all the time in the Rule 5 draft. While I also like the drama that this could create, I don't see why we couldn't also allow some keeper slot trades. For example, we could cap the total number of keepers at 10 (or 8 or 12). The question is really how much do we want to enforce parity on the league. Personally, I don't want this to be the NFL, but I also want some limits on dynasty building.

Finally, on a personal note, the law firm I am working for has recently told me that it is holding orientation for my summer job the weekend of the draft (here in Philly). So, I need to find out if I can get out of it.